This paper provides new evidence on the effect of immigration on local election outcomes. Our analysis makes use of data on city districts in Hamburg, Germany, during a period of substantial inflows of immigrants and asylum seekers. We find significant and robust effects for changes in foreigner shares on the electoral success of parties that built up a distinctive reputation in immigration politics. In particular, our fixed-effects estimates indicate a positive effect for xenophobic, extreme right-wing parties and an adverse effect for the Green party that actively campaigned for liberal immigration policies and minority rights.
Recent elections campaigns in European countries have demonstrated that immigration is still a major topic which generates strong emotional reactions in broad sections of the population. In many countries the electorate has increasingly supported antiimmigration parties. For example, in Denmark the Danish People Party came into political power advocating restrictive immigration policies and campaigning against multiculturalism. Similar developments took place in the Netherlands and Hungary, where anti-immigrant parties have gained strong political support.
Our paper addresses this phenomenon and provides first evidence on the causal relationship between immigration and the success of anti-immigration parties at the city district level. In addition to this, we investigate in how far changes in foreigner concentration also affect the electoral support of pro-immigration parties. We make use of a unique data set on city districts in Hamburg covering the period 1987 to 1998.
During this time, Germany, in particular German cities, experienced a strong change in its ethnic composition due to large inflows of immigrants and asylum seekers. As a consequence, immigration issues gained importance in the political sphere. In our analysis, we focus on the local outcomes of federal and national elections in 103 city districts. Our empirical analysis is based on a fixed effect model allowing to control for all differences between districts that do not change over time. Furthermore, we apply an instrumental variable approach, which has been rarely used in the literature on the relationship between migration and election outcomes. This approach takes into account endogenous location decisions of immigrants, and by this helps to tighten the causal link between immigration and the success of pro-and anti-immigration parties. We find a significant and positive relationship between growing concentration of foreigners and share of votes for the extreme right wing. Our results indicate that the effect had a substantial size and explains roughly a quarter of the increases in local anti-immigration parties' votes shares. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that an increasing concentration of foreigners within a district reduces support for parties that campaign for liberal immigration policies and minority rights. This paper complements the growing literature on individual attitudes and immigration which has stressed the role of economic interests in shaping individual preferences on immigration (among others Hanson, Scheve & Slaughter (2007) , Facchini & Mayda (2009) , Gang, Rivera-Batiz & Yun (2010) ). In particular, these studies highlight that attitudes towards immigration are shaped both by labour market and welfare state conditions. Through the first channel, individual attitudes depend on the actual and potential wage effects of immigration. Natives who are substitutes for immigrants expect a negative wage effect and therefore are likely to oppose immigration. In contrast, natives who enjoy a complementary relationship to immigrants are likely to support liberal immigration policies due to potential wage benefits. As for the welfare state channel, attitudes depend on the distributional effect of immigration through transfers and taxes. For example, in countries characterized by unskilled immigration, a redistributive tax system and adjustable tax rates support for immigration tends to decrease with individual income (Facchini & Mayda (2009) ).
In addition, the literature highlights the importance of non-economic determinants of individual attitudes on immigration. This third channel takes into account that public opinions on immigration also might be shaped by social and cultural considerations of the native population. As Hillman (1994) points out native population could gain utility from its own ethnic and cultural identity and, therefore, favour restrictive immigration policies to preserve traditional culture and to maintain an ethnic composition of citizens consistent with this goal. Indeed, Mayda (2006) and O' Rourke & Sinnott (2006) find in cross-country comparisons that having a strong national identity, respectively national sentiments, is negatively associated with pro-immigration attitudes. Recent findings of Dustmann & Preston (2007) for the UK underscore that racial prejudices are an important determinant of attitudes on immigration. Moreover, inflows of foreigners into a region are likely to imply non-economic externalities for the native population shaping public opinions on immigration (Card, Dustmann & Preston (2012) ). In principle, rising concentrations of immigrants within an area can affect native attitudes on immigration in two ways: they could either help to reduce existing prejudices towards foreigners through intercultural exchange and communication (contact hypothesis) or they could be perceived as a threat to the culture and identity of the native population (group conflict theory) (Dustmann & Preston (2001) ). It is reasonable to assume that both effects matter, however, a priori the overall effect on native attitudes towards immigration is not obvious.
Findings from the British Social Attitudes Survey indicate that the negative identity effect outweighs positive effects of interethnic contacts. This holds particularly true, if one considers the endogenous nature of location decisions (Dustmann & Preston (2001) ). Recent results based on data from the European Social Survey show that concerns about migration induced changes in local compositional amenities explain most of the differences in attitudes towards immigration policy across natives (Card et al. (2012) ). In line with this, Lubbers & Scheepers (2001) in their study on voting intentions in Germany find that regional concentrations of immigrants are likely to influence support for right-wing parties. However, as highlighted by Miguet (2008) studies on attitudes and voting intentions are likely to be affected by a "hypothetical bias" since interviewed individuals are aware that their answers will not have any direct impact on policies and the political balance of power. In this case, intentions and actual behavior will differ to some extent. Empirical evidence on how far the relationship between immigration and attitudes, respectively voting intentions, transfers into policy outcomes is scarce. Noteworthy exceptions are the recent studies of Gerdes & Wadensjö (2010) and Harmon (2012) for Denmark and by Halla, Wagner & Zweimüller (2012) for Austria which observe a positive relationship between the electoral success of right-wing parties and concentration of foreigners.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a short summary of the political landscape and immigration history in Germany and Hamburg. Section 3 contains a description of the data used as well as descriptive statistics. In Section 4, the results of the empirical analysis are presented. Section 5 concludes the paper.
With the exception of the founding period of the Federal Republic of Germany's representative democracy, the political landscape in West Germany as well as in Hamburg for many decades was dominated by three parties: The conservative, center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 1 , the center-left Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), and the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP). In 1982, the Greens, which campaigned in Hamburg under the name Green Alternative List (GAL), surmounted the 5-percent electoral threshold in Hamburg's federal state elections and joined the SPD and the CDU in the Bürgerschaft, Hamburg's legislative assembly.
One year later the Greens received 5.6% of the national vote and established as the new, fourth political party in the national parliament. The Greens emerged from the peace and the anti-nuclear movements and attracted mainly support from voters on the political left and the new social movements, a group of activists who tried to push forward new policy issues, like environmental politics, civil rights, and women's participation rights (see Müller-Rommel (1985) ). The end of the cold war and the party 2 . However, in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s extreme right-wing parties gathered increasing support from the electorate and especially the Republicans (REP) and the German People's Union (DVU) managed to take seats in a number of federal state parliaments.
Despite notable influxes of immigrants (guest workers) in the 1960s and 1970s, large parts of the German society and political parties -mainly the CDU/CSUrejected the notion of Germany as an immigration country. Naturalization procedures in the 1980s and 1990s were rather restrictive and citizenship was determined by Ius Sanguinis. Immigration policy significantly gained importance in the political sphere and in election campaigns during the 1980s (see Thränhardt (2000) ). The political debate on immigration centered around family reunions of Turkish immigrants and growing inflows of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler ) and asylum requests. The latter were increasingly used as a means to immigrate to Germany.
In 1992, the debate on immigration climaxed on the issue of asylum politics.
Rising numbers of asylum requests (more than 400.000 in 1992) lead to the so called 'asylum compromise' (Asylkompromiss) where the christian democratic, liberal, and social democratic fractions in the German parliament voted for a change of the German Basic Law (constitution) to curtail asylum seekers' rights and to cut down immigration of refugees. Furthermore, the German government relaxed the employment ban for refugees to decrease the excess welfare dependency of asylum applicants. 3 Parallel to this policy change, extreme right-wing parties massively agitated against refugees and immigrants using the motto "Das Boot ist voll!" ("The boat is brimful !"). During this period, Germany experienced a number of xenophobic attacks against Turkish immigrants and refugees. In the asylum debate the Green 2 In Germany as well as in Hamburg the extreme right wing is rather fragmented and characterized by a number of small parties. A common characteristic of these parties is their fundamental opposition against immigration and multiculturalism. For the empirical analysis we aggregate the voter turnout of the different extreme right-wing parties. Table 10 in the appendix gives an overview.
3 For a comprehensive overview about the relation of immigration and welfare states see Nannestad (2007) .
Party took a clear stance for open borders and permissive asylum procedures. 4
Furthermore, in its national election programs in the 1990s (Die Grünen (1990) , Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (1994) , and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (1998) ) it actively advocated the concept of a multicultural society and liberal immigration politics. In 1998, a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens formed the German government. In 2000, the coalition introduced a new citizenship law easing naturalization proceedings and implementing the principle of Ius Soli, whereby immigrants receive the German citizenship by birth if they are born in Germany (Steinhardt (2012) ).
Many polls and election surveys confirm the view that immigration policy was an important topic in the political discourse and in election campaigns (see Falter, Gabriel, Rattinger & Schmitt (1998) and infas (1986)). Voter perception of party positions in the field of immigration policy is provided in the German National Election Studies 1998, the leading representative election survey in Germany (Falter et al. (1998) ). Figure 1 depicts the answers of a representative sample of voters to the question of how they perceived parties' attitudes towards immigration policy.
Respondents were asked to classify parties' positions on a scale ranging from 1 (ease immigration) to 7 (restrict immigration). As the diagram shows, easing immigration is undoubtedly a unique selling proposition of the Greens. Contrary to that restricting immigration is a unique feature of the extreme right wing. For other parties voter perception is mixed. The social democrats (SPD) were considered to be more pro immigration, conservatives (CDU) to be more against immigration, and liberals (FDP) as well as Socialists (PDS) were considered to be rather neutral or undecided.
Another piece of evidence for the exceptional role of the Greens regarding immigration policy is provided by the Hamburg's 1986 federal state election survey conducted by infas (1986) . Voters were asked about party preferences and about their opinion on the xenophobic motto "Foreigners out!". Table 1 shows Respondents were asked to comment on the following statement: "There are too many foreigners, guest workers, asylum seekers in Germany. They steal jobs from Germans, alienate German culture, and live on aid. Therefore one has to claim: Foreigners out!" * Percentages may not add up to 100 due to no answers. Source: infas (1986).
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rejected this statement.
Federal state elections in Hamburg as well as national elections are held every four years. However, between 1986 and 1998 there were three departures from this rule. The last national election in the Federal Republic of Germany was held in 1987.
According to the schedule, the next election was supposed to take place in 1991.
However, the German Unification lead to the first election in unified Germany in 1990.
Here the Greens lost voter support as a consequence of their openly stated critique of the unification process. The 1986 federal state election in Hamburg ended with a political tie and a re-election was held in 1987. The next election in 1991 took place on schedule but in 1993 federal state elections in Hamburg were held prematurely because the constitutional court ruled for re-elections due to undemocratic procedures within the conservative party (CDU) in the run-up to the 1991 elections. Table 2 gives the election results in Hamburg for federal state and national elections.
Data
Our dataset draws from two sources. First, we use data from the District database ("Stadtteildatenbank"), a database for the 103 districts of the city of Hamburg which concentration measures based on citizenship can no longer be considered as proxies of ethnic heterogeneity, because they treat naturalized immigrants and native born children of immigrants as Germans. Therefore, we decided to focus on elections, which took place before 2000. Furthermore, we have to exclude four districts, which are mainly used for industrial and commercial activities, due to data restrictions.
Overall, after matching both data sources we obtain a panel data set with 99 districts (cross sections) and 7 elections (years).
Our dependent variable is the local voting outcome of parties (E it ) which promoted a clear and distinctive position on immigration. On the one hand, we consider the aggregate share of voters of extreme right-wing parties which agitated against immigrants and refugees. On the other hand, we focus on election outcomes of the Green party. As described in Section 2, the Green party was the only party in the German political spectrum which promoted liberal immigration and integration policies unconditionally and campaigned for the rights of minorities. We further outlined that the unique position of the Greens towards immigration is supported by the voters' perception.
The main explanatory variable in our analysis is the district's foreigner share, ForShare. It might change over time as a result of migration movements or through demographic developments. The latter will happen if the immigrant population within a district is characterized by a younger age structure or higher fertility rates than the native population, or both. In any case, our main explanatory variable captures changes in the ethnic composition of a district, respectively, in the size of the minority population. Based on recent evidence from the literature highlighting the role of non-economic externalities of immigration (Card et al. (2012) ), we expect increases in a district's share of foreigners to have an effect on the district's election outcomes of parties which promote liberal or restrictive immigration policies. More explicitly, we would expect a positive effect for extreme right-wing parties and an adverse effect for the success of the Green party.
To capture changes in the composition of voters and socio-demographic characteristics of districts we include controls for population size (Population), share of pensioners (PenShare), and share of children (KidsShare). Information on average income levels is not available for all election years. We therefore decided to use our income measure (Income) only as a sensitivity check. 5 Instead, to proxy for the economic status of households we use the average endowment of housing services, measured in square meters per capita (SqmCapita), as a proxy for the economic situation of households. Unfortunately, our data set does not contain information on education background. Furthermore, data on unemployment on the district level is available only for the last two elections in the period of interest. To control for longitudinal changes in unemployment we constructed a measure of unemployment rates (UnempShare) using both claimant count data for the years 1997 and 1998 as well as ILO unemployment data from the census in 1987. Since these measures are based on different definitions of unemployment this is just a rough measure to be used with caution. 6 In addition to this, we control for crime by using the number of violent crimes per thousand inhabitants (Violence). Finally, we also consider voter turnout (Turnout) which often affects election outcomes significantly because it benefits party outcomes asymmetrically. Table 3 provides summary statistics for the variables mentioned above. Figure 2 in the appendix shows the initial foreigner shares in the 99 districts in 1987 and their changes between 1987 and 1997. As panel (a) illustrates, the highest concentration of immigrants was found in districts close to the city center. Panel (b) shows significant increases in the foreigner shares especially in districts south and south east to the city center. Overall, the changes in foreigner concentration were unevenly distributed across city districts. Figure 3 shows levels and changes in voter support for the extreme right-wing parties. Starting from a very low level (panel (a)) extreme right-wing parties gathered increasing electoral support during the 1990s (panel (b) ). This holds particularly true for districts in the south and in the east of the city, which experienced relatively strong inflows of immigrants. Figure 4 finally 5 Here we substitute missing income data in election years with income data one year before or after the election.
6 However, to some extent this caveat would even hold in the case of claimant count numbers whose underlying definition has also been changed several times due to the implementation of new labour market policies, fiscal constraints, and other political reasons. depicts levels and changes in vote shares of the Greens. Note that the Greens, who gained an average increase in voter share of 6.9 percentage points in federal state elections between 1987 to 1997, experienced relatively low increases in voter support in the south and in the east of Hamburg (panel (b) ). On the other hand, they experienced strong increases in the city center districts, which were characterized by relatively low to average inflows of foreigners.
Empirical analysis
In this section we analyze the relationship between immigration and voting outcomes of anti-and pro-immigrant parties at the city district level. First, in Section 4.1 we provide results from a model with district fixed effects allowing to control for time constant unobserved district heterogeneity. In Section 4.2, we assess the robustness of our empirical analysis by alternative specifications of the empirical model and changes in the sample composition. In Section 4.3, we address the issue of endogenous location choices of immigrants and natives. Finally, we discuss our findings in Section 4.4 considering additional results for other parties.
Fixed effects model
To test the relation between the success of political parties and immigration we estimate the following model:
where E it is the vote share of the the extreme right-wing parties, respectively of the Green party, in district i at time t. Our main explanatory variable F orShare it measures the share of immigrants in the population within a district at time t. Significance levels : * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%
District and time fixed effects included.
Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
they do not use an empirical approach that allows to derive statements about causal relationship.
Our estimates in column 2 indicate that the Greens suffered from rising foreigner shares. This is a reasonable finding, since the Greens, as pointed out in section 2, were the only party which promoted liberal immigration policies and actively campaigned for permissive asylum procedures. Our results therefore show that rising immigration in this period affected the electoral success of parties that took a clear stance towards immigration on both sides of the political spectrum.
The quantitative effects of an increase in foreigner shares are also substantial in Our results further suggest that an increase in the share of pensioners and households with children is associated with gains in the electoral support of extreme right-wing parties. On the other hand, growing shares of children and retired persons within a district are negatively related to the success of the Green party. This implies that young and middle-aged singles vote for the Green party. A significantly negative relationship between age and electoral support for the Greens has also been found by Klein (2009) . Changes in the living space and voter participation seem to have no influence on the success of anti-immigration parties. However, the negative and significant coefficient of square meter per capita in column 2 indicates that increases in wealth lowered the support for the Green party. Moreover, our results show that the Green party is likely to gain from growing voter participation rates.
Our results continue to hold if we take into account the bounded nature of our dependent variable, which is a fraction between 0 and 1, and make use of a pooled fractional probit estimator. The corresponding model was developed by Papke & Wooldridge (2008) Table 5 presents results from different specifications and subsamples. To assess the robustness of our results in column 1, we add average income in a district to our benchmark specification. Our estimates indicate that our main results continue to hold if we allow for changes in district income over time. Furthermore, the results suggest that anti-immigration parties profit from growing income within districts. This is in line with findings from the attitudes literature about the role of the welfare channel. Growing income is likely to reduce support for unskilled immigrants since the latter are likely to be net receivers of public benefits from the welfare state (see for example Nannestad (2007) ). This is particularly true in our case because large shares of immigrants during our observation period were refugees with a high welfare dependency. However, due to the rough nature of our income measure, this result should be treated with caution. In Column 2, we further explore the role of unemployment. Notice that the number of observations falls substantially, as we only have measures on unemployment for three election years (1987, 1997, 1998) .
Robustness checks
Including unemployment, which is positively correlated with the level of immigrants, does neither affect the sign or significance of our main results. With respect to the labor market channel, a caveat of our data set is that we were not able to control for changes in skill levels over time, which are shown to be important in shaping individual attitudes on migration. However, we have to consider that many inhabitants in a city do not work in their living area. Therefore, at this disaggregated level we cannot expect to find significant labor market drivers in voting outcomes.
Columns 3 and 4 show that our main findings also hold if we run separate regressions for local and national elections. Interestingly, we find that the relationship between a district's ethnic composition and the electoral success of pro-and anti-immigration parties is stronger in regional elections than in national ballots. The estimates for extreme right-wing parties suggest that negative reactions towards rising numbers of immigrants within an urban district particularly influence voting behavior in regional elections. Results in column 5 show that our main findings are not affected if we weight our estimates by the population size of districts.
Endogenous location choices
So far, we have not taken into account that location choices of both immigrants and natives are not exogenous, but driven by individual preferences. With respect to natives, two potential scenarios arise. In the first scenario, local residents respond to increasing immigration by outmigration and relocate within the city. In an alternative scenario, natives would move to districts which experienced inflows of foreigners due to potential benefits of ethnic diversity. Both cases, displacement and attraction, would imply that we underestimate the true effect of immigration on electoral outcomes of anti-immigration parties. To rule out any bias from native relocation choices, in which local residents react to immigration by "voting with their feet", we follow Peri & Sparber (2011) and estimate a regression model of native displacement based on the work of Card (2007) . Using microsimulations with artificial data sets Peri & Sparber (2011) demonstrated that the model is able to uncover positive as well as negative relationships between immigration and native location decisions and is superior to alternative specifications. The model estimated is:
with N it and F it being the number of natives and foreigners in a city district, respectively. P op it−1 describes the overall district population at t − 1. The corresponding result is provided in table 6 and shows that we do not find any statistical evidence for native migration responses to inflows of immigrants. A very similar relationship was found for Austria by Halla et al. (2012) . Significance levels : * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%
However, we still have to deal with endogenous location choices of immigrants.
On the one hand, they are likely to move to districts which are characterized by a liberal environment, whereas they tend to avoid areas with anti-immigrant sentiments.
On the other hand, immigrants might be forced to cluster in poor city districts where precarious social conditions probably serve as a hotbed for xenophobic sentiments.
Although both effects could offset each other, we have to consider that each of them could bias our estimates. We therefore decided to use the previous concentration of immigrants as an instrument for the actual immigrant share within a district.
This approach is based on the idea that immigrants are likely to move to locations which already exhibit high shares of co-ethnics (see for example Dustmann, Fabbri & Preston (2005) and Mocetti & Porello (2010) ). In particular, we rely on lags of 6 years. For the construction of our instrument, we make use of additional data from population registers. The first stage results are provided in table 7. The positive and significant coefficient shows that the settlement structures of immigrants in t − 6 positively affect the location decisions of foreigners at time t. The high value of Shea's between the historical settlement pattern and actual immigrant concentrations. 8
Moreover, our instrument passes the weak identification test with an F-statistic larger than 10, which is a commonly used threshold, and above the ten percent critical value proposed by Stock and Yogo. Significance levels : * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%
District and time fixed effects as well as the controls from the benchmark specification are included.
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
Additional results
Last but not least, our findings raise the question whether local voting results are driven by non-economic considerations, including xenophobia and neighborhood amenities, or by concerns about negative welfare implications of immigration. To address this issue it is instructive to take a look at the voting outcomes of parties, which did not have a clear stance towards immigration. We therefore ran our (2SLS) regression with fixed effects also for the CDU, SPD, and FDP. The corresponding results are provided in table 9. With respect to the SPD and CDU, we do not find any evidence for a significant relationship between changes in foreigner shares and electoral success. However, we do find a positive effect of immigration on the electoral success of the FDP which is similar in size to the one for rightwing parties. The findings for the SPD and CDU are in line with the fact that voter perception of parties'
attitudes towards immigration policy are mixed for both parties (see Section 2). In other words, they are not perceived as being pro or anti immigration. In addition to this, both parties are classical "Volksparteien", i.e. following a big tent approach.
The latter does not hold true for the FDP which has developed into the direction of a single-issue party since the 1980s favoring tax cuts and reforms of the state-funded
German welfare system. Within the political spectrum, the FDP is characterized by a clear and distinct critical position towards income redistribution. With respect to immigration, the FDP has been considered rather neutral or undecided (see figure   1 ). The fact that we find a positive relationship between immigration and electoral success of the FDP indicates that immigration also affects electoral outcomes by shaping voters' preferences regarding the size and scope of the welfare state: more immigration is likely to be associated with additional support for welfare cuts and less redistribution. This is a reasonable finding, because immigration in our observation period was characterized by low skilled immigrants who mainly worked at the bottom of the income distribution. Furthermore, Germany experienced a sizable influx of asylum seekers, who were largely dependent on welfare. As a result, local immigration was likely to be perceived as a net burden to the welfare state and as stretching public goods. For this reason, we cannot rule out that welfare state considerations also affected voting outcomes of the extreme right-wing parties. ForeignLag (lag length: 6 years)
Significance levels : * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%
Conclusion
Within the last years, a number of European countries experienced growing electoral support for parties, which campaigned for restrictive immigration policies. While the literature has mainly focused on economic interests in explaining individual preferences on immigration, a number of economists (see for example Hillman (1994) and Mayda (2006) ) highlighted the importance of non-economic determinants like cultural preferences and national sentiments. Recently, economists have renewed their interest in the role of non-economic effects of immigration in shaping public opinion towards migration policies. Latest findings suggest that concerns about migrationdriven changes in compositional amenities explain most of the differences in attitudes towards immigration policy across natives (Card et al. (2012) ). These non-economic effects are local in nature and relate to compositional changes in neighborhoods, workplaces and schools. The present paper addresses this potential channel of influence and presents new insights about the relationship between local immigrant concentrations and the success of pro and anti-immigration parties. The analysis focuses on local districts in Hamburg in the period 1987 to 1998 in which the city experienced substantial inflows of immigrants and asylum seekers.
Our results indicate a positive and substantial impact of growing shares of foreigners on political success of extreme right-wing parties. In addition, we find a negative association between rising concentrations of immigrants and electoral support of the Green party, which was the only major party promoting liberal immigration and asylum policies during this time. Our results hold both for regional as well as national elections. Furthermore, our findings continue to hold when we consider endogenous location decisions of immigrants by instrumenting local foreigner shares with previous settlement patterns of immigrants. Moreover, we can rule out that our estimates are biased by native migration responses.
Our results are in line with recent evidence on the role of compositional amenities shaping individual attitudes towards immigration. Anti-immigration parties gain support if local concentrations of foreigners rise, while parties campaigning for liberal asylum and minority rights lose power. These findings might reflect the particular situation during the early 1990s in Germany, which was characterized by exceptionally strong inflows of refugees and contentious public debates about asylum abuse. Therefore, the electoral support of extreme right-wing parties was possibly also influenced by welfare state considerations or concerns about declines in the provision and quality of local public goods. Further research is needed to distinguish between these interrelated channels and to test the generality of our results.
With respect to policy, our analysis highlights the local dimension of immigration.
In particular, our results show that the regional distribution of immigrants might have important implications for attitudes towards foreigners and immigration policy.
The positive relationship between immigration and the electoral success of extreme right-wing parties in the 1990s implies that policymakers are well advised if they try to prevent situations in which immigrants, or refugees, cluster in few districts within a city. This aim is in conflict with the fact that immigrants are likely to follow existing family or community ties. Furthermore, integration policies need to be developed at local levels that incorporate effects of immigration on regional amenities and public goods. (a) Foreigner share in 1987 [-4 ; 0[ pp [0 ; 5[ pp [5 ; 10[ pp [10 ; 35] 
